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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GORGOZA, INCORPORATED, 
a corporation, and JAMES 
B. CONKLING and DONNA D. 
CONKLING, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Defendant and 
Respondent 
Case No- 14351 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for the breach 
of a contract under which the defendant Utah State Road 
Commission (now Department of Transportation) obligated itself 
to provide reasonable commercial access to the plaintiffs1 
winter resort facilities pursuant to eminent domain proceed-
ings in which the State Road Commission eventually condemned 
approximately eight acres of the plaintiffs1 land. In the same 
action, plaintiffs alleged that the Commission negligently created 
a defective, unsafe and dangerous condition of a highway and other 
public improvements which caused the plaintiffs1 injury. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Third Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge, 
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granting defendant State Road Commission's motion for summary 
judgment and dismissing plaintiffs1 complaint with prejudice 
on the grounds that no binding agreement or enforceable con-
tract existed between the parties and that the State had not, 
therefore, waived its immunity from suits of this kind. (R. 133.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs pray the court to reverse the aforesaid 
summary judgment and to remand the case for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In response to Governor Rampton's appeal for the 
development of new industries in Utah, plaintiffs James B. and 
Donna D. Conkling initiated and developed the Gorgoza Summer-
Winter Resort which opened for business in Summit County, Utah, 
during the month of December, 196 8. (R. 1, 38.) Following a 
profitable first year's operation, the State Road Commission 
closed the lower portion of Parley's Canyon for the purpose of 
constructing a section of Interstate Highway 80 - East. After 
unsuccessfully appealing the closure and in spite of the diffi-
culties presented thereby, Gorgoza managed to remain in operation 
for a second year. Planned investments in summer facilities were 
necessarily postponed, however, as potential investors withdrew 
their subscriptions and the SBA declined to approve Gorgoza's 
loan application. 
When Parley's Canyon reopened during the summer of 
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1970, Gorgoza obtained the required financing and began con-
struction of additional summer and winter facilities, reserving 
additional funds to complete its summer facilities the following 
spring. In September of 1970, the resort embarked upon its 
third year of operations. 
Prior to reopening for its third winter season, Gorgoza 
officials held several meetings with representatives of the State 
Department of Highways in an attempt to determine how the resort 
would be affected by future 1-80 and frontage road construction 
projects. In addition, Gorgoza officials supplied the State with 
cost data and other information which pointed out Gorgoza's need 
for adequate access to its commercial and recreational facilities 
during periods of construction in the canyon. (R. 33-35.) 
In early spring of 1971, the plaintiffs became concerned 
about the indefinite work schedule on 1-80 and the frontage road, 
the lack of specific information regarding commercial access 
from U.S. 40 during the upcoming construction periods, and 
unresolved problems about entrance lighting and highway signs. 
Plaintiff James Conkling therefore initiated direct correspondence 
with Mr. Henry Helland, Director of the Department of Highways, 
concerning these problems. (R. 36-40.) When the Department's 
response failed to provide sufficiently detailed information on 
which to base future development plans, Mr. Conkling by letter of 
May 29, 1971, specifically requested the State's assurance "that 
we will have the kind of access that will permit us to stay in 
business during the construction stages." (R. 40.) 
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During the first week of June, 1971, Mr. Leland D. 
Ford, attorney for the State Road Commission, contacted Mr. 
Robert F. Orton, attorney for plaintiffs, and requested that 
Mr. Orton accept service of process and consent to the entry of 
an order of immediate occupancy on behalf of Gorgoza in an 
eminent domain proceeding which was being instituted by the State 
for the purpose of condemning approximately eight acres of the 
plaintiffs1 land. (R. 1, 76.) Mr. Orton agreed to accept 
service of process and to consent to immediate entry of the 
order in exchange for the State's promise that certain terms, 
provisions, and obligations regarding access to and use of 
Gorgoza's remaining property during the construction period 
would be incorporated into and made a part of the order. (R. 76.) 
Thereafter Mr. Ford submitted a proposed order of immediate 
occupancy to Mr. Orton which was rejected on the grounds that 
it did not spell out the State's obligations in sufficient detail. 
(R. 76 and Exhibit "A" at 80-82.) 
On the 7th day of June, 1971, Mr. Orton and Mr. Ford 
negotiated and agreed upon the terms to be included in the order 
of immediate occupancy to be entered by the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Summit County, State of Utah. (R. 76.) On 
the same day, Mr. Orton acknowledged service of process on behalf 
of Gorgoza and the court entered the order incorporating the 
stipulation and agreement of the parties. (R. 77 and Exhibit "B" 
at 87-89.) Following the entry of said order, the venue of the 
-4-
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eminent domain proceedings was changed to the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R. 77.) 
By stipulating and agreeing to the entry of said order 
of immediate occupancy, defendant State Road Commission agreed 
and was ordered to provide plaintiffs and the general public 
with reasonable access to the remaining property of Gorgoza so 
as not to interfere with the commercial and recreational activi-
ties being conducted thereon, nor to discourage the general 
public from frequenting and going upon the property. (R. 77.) 
The term "reasonable" for purposes of the order was defined to 
include "safe and easy ingress and egress to and from said property 
and notice to the general public of the access to Gorgoza's 
remaining property." (R. 88.) Defendant State Road Commission 
further agreed to be enjoined and was enjoined by the order from 
hindering or interfering with the use, occupation and enjoyment 
by plaintiffs of their remaining property and the commercial and 
recreational activities being conducted thereon. (R. 77.) 
During the fall of 1971, an intolerable situation 
developed regarding access to Gorgoza1s property. (R. 21.) 
The frontage road had not been completed, no access route from 
U.S. 40 had been constructed, and the deadline for deciding 
whether to reopen for a fourth winter season was rapidly 
approaching. (R. 41.) Because of the seriousness of the problem, 
on September 24, 1971, James Conkling met directly with Governor 
Rampton to inform him of the situation and to appeal for emergency 
aid. (R. 21.) Following this meeting, Mr. Conkling met with 
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representatives of the State Department of Highways on September 
28, 1971, to discuss the problem and to submit certain data 
prepared by Gorgoza for the State's review. (R. 21, 41-45.) 
At this meeting, the State Highway Engineer, Mr. Blaine Kay, 
gave assurances that Gorgoza would be promptly provided with 
a surfaced entrance and driveway in the area of Gorgoza's choice 
so as to alleviate the critical access problem. (R. 21.) 
On October 5, 1971, Mr. Conkling again contacted Mr. Kay to 
inform him of his concern over the State's apparent decision 
to improve Gorgoza's sloping middle entrance instead of its 
level western entrance as previously discussed, and to request 
further assurances that adequate commercial access would be 
made available so that the crucial decision about opening for 
the 1971-72 winter season could be made. (R. 46, 48.) 
Although the State did construct an access to 
Gorgoza's property by way of its middle entrance on or about 
October 15, 1971, by October 29, 1971, it was apparent that the 
access was in utter disrepair. (R. 50-51.) On November 2, 
Mr. Conkling notified Mr. Kay of the terrible condition of the 
access road and urgently requested that improvements be made to 
correct the situation. (R. 50.) Mr. Kay consequently reminded 
the district engineer in writing of the State's commitment to 
Gorgoza and directed him to make the necessary improvements as 
soon as possible. (R. 51.) 
On November 11, Gorgoza received notice from its 
insurance company that its policies had been cancelled on the 
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grounds that the resort was not ready for inspection due to the 
access problem. (R. 22.) Faced with this development together 
with the intolerable access situation, Gorgoza officials decided 
to discontinue operations indefinitely and so notified the State. 
(R. 52.) 
During the summer of 1972, the access situation had 
still not improved which resulted in further deterioration of 
prospective investor interest. (R. 22.) Gorgoza officials 
therefore obtained an order to show cause why the order of imme-
diate occupancy previously entered should not be vacated and the 
condemnation action dismissed or, alternatively, why they should 
not be granted other appropriate relief. (R. 77 and Exhibit "C" 
at 94.) On the 27th day of October, 1972, the parties stipulated 
and agreed to the entry of an order on order to show cause which 
permitted Gorgoza officials to assert their claims for damages 
arising out of the alleged breach of the provisions of the order 
of immediate occupancy in an independent action. (R. 77-78 and 
Exhibit "D" at 96.) 
On November 7, 1972, the parties entered into a stipula-
tion for just compensation in the eminent domain proceedings which 
stipulation contained the following language: 
Defendants [Gorgoza, Incorporated, James B. Conkling 
and Donna D. Conkling] reserve all rights described 
in the order on order to show cause entered by this 
Court on the 27th day of October, 1972, which order 
is on file herein and further reserve all rights 
described in the order of immediate occupancy dated 
the 7th day of June, 1971, which order of immediate 
occupancy is on file herein and the parties hereto 
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hereby agree that they shall continue to be bound 
by all of the provisions of said order of immediate 
occupancy. (R. 78.) (Emphasis added.) 
The stipulation described above did not fully dispose 
of the eminent domain proceedings and a trial was thereafter 
conducted. Following the trial, the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered findings of 
fact and conclusions of law which provided as follows: 
Defendants Gorgoza and Conkling have reserved all 
rights described in the order on order to show 
cause entered by this Court on the 27th day of 
October, 1972, and in the order of immediate 
occupancy dated June 7, 1971, and the Court finds 
that defendants have not waived any of said rights. 
(Finding of Fact Number 23, R. 78; See also Conclu-
sion of Law Number 6, R. 7 8.) 
The plaintiffs filed their complaint for money damages 
against the State Road Commission and its general contractor 
on February 8, 1974. (R. 1.) Following discovery procedures, 
both Gorgoza and the State Road Commission filed motions 
for summary judgment supported by a stipulation of facts 
on the sole issue whether the agreement between the parties 
which was incorporated into the order of immediate occupancy 
entered on June 7, 1971, constituted a valid contractual obliga-
tion which was binding on the State. (R. 119-20; 128-29.) 
After duly considering the motions, the Honorable 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. adopted the parties1 stipulation of facts 
and granted defendant State Road Commission's motion for summary 
judgment as prayed. (R. 130-32.) The court then dismissed 
plaintiffs1 entire complaint, including the negligence count, 
with prejudice and this appeal followed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN GORGOZA AND 
THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION, NEGOTIATED 
AND EXECUTED BY THE ATTORNEY FOR THE 
COMMISSION, CREATED A BINDING CON-
TRACTUAL OBLIGATION WHICH IS ENFORCE-
ABLE AGAINST THE STATE, SINCE THE 
AGREEMENT WAS FULLY ADOPTED AND 
RATIFIED BY THE COMMISSION FOLLOWING 
ITS EXECUTION BY THE STATE'S ATTORNEY. 
The sole issue submitted to the lower court for deter-
mination on the parties' respective motions for summary judgment 
was whether a valid, existing and enforceable contract between 
Gorgoza and the State Road Commission was created under the 
factual situation before the court. Gorgoza contends that the 
lower court erred in its first, sixth, and seventh conclusions 
of law to the effect that no such contract was created under 
the facts. (R. 130-31.) 
A. COURTS WILL ENFORCE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES TO A CONDEMNATION 
SUIT. 
Courts have frequently pointed out the difference in 
legal effect between mere promissory statements made by a con-
demning authority and valid, contractual, and therefore binding 
stipulations between the parties to a condemnation suit. 
26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain §154 at 821 (1966); Annot., 7 ALR2d 
364, 392 (1949). If a particular case involves an agreement 
based on mutual assent and legal consideration, the agreement 
is properly to be considered in determining the property owner's 
damages or compensation. See Annot., 7 ALR2d. supra at 393, 
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and cases cited therein. If a binding stipulation does exist, 
numerous courts have declared that any marked departure therefrom 
as to the character of the work to be accomplished or the rights 
to be reserved would subject the condemnor to an action for 
damages in favor of the landowner whose land was being taken. 
Id. at 397. 
Although Gorgoza does not contend that its remaining 
property was "taken" by the State's failure to provide reasonable 
commercial access as agreed, it does contend that the cases 
cited above clearly support the principle that binding contractual 
agreements between the condemning authority and the condemnee 
will be given legal effect where necessary to protect the land-
owner from additional damage caused by the condemnor•s subsequent 
breach. 
In the instant case, the stipulation of facts on file 
herein makes it clear that: 
1. Plaintiffs and defendant State Road Commission 
by and through their respective attorneys arrived at the terms 
of an agreement regarding commercial access to plaintiffs1 
remaining land by negotiation and mutual assent. (Stipulation 
of Facts Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6, R. 76.) 
2. The terms of this agreement were subsequently 
incorporated into the order of immediate occupancy entered by 
the court on June 7, 1971. (Stipulation of Fact No. 6, R. 76.) 
3. In arriving at the terms of the agreement, plaintiffs1 
attorney promised to accept service of process on behalf of his 
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clients and thereby waived Gorgoza's objections to the proposed 
location of the new highway in exchange for the State's promise 
to incorporate certain terms, provisions and obligations regard-
ing access and use of plaintiffs1 remaining property into the 
proposed order of immediate occupancy. (Stipulation of Fact 
No. 4, R. 76.) 
4. Plaintiffs thereby incurred a legal detriment 
in that they agreed to accept service of process and to permit 
immediate entry of an order of immediate occupancy which they 
were not previously obligated to do. Plaintiffs simultaneously 
conferred a benefit on defendant State Road Commission by elimina-
ting the time and expense of serving process on nonresident 
defendants, waiting for a hearing date on the motion, and pre-
senting evidence in support of the motion at the hearing. 
(Stipulation of Facts Nos. 3 and 4, R. 76.) 
5. Similarly, defendant State Road Commission incurred 
a legal detriment by promising to provide reasonable access to 
plaintiffs' remaining land and to be enjoined from interfering 
with plaintiff's commercial and recreational use, both of which 
duties defendant State Road Commission was not previously obliga-
ted to perform. (Stipulation of Fact No. 8, R. 77; R. 105.) 
Simultaneously, defendant State Road Commission conferred a 
benefit on plaintiffs by saving them the time and expense of 
additional litigation or negotiating procedures to resolve the 
problem at that time. 
-11-
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6. The terms of the agreement between the parties 
have not been altered in any way since the order of immediate 
occupancy was entered on June 7, 1971. On the contrary, the 
parties subsequently reaffirmed the provisions of the order and 
agreed to continue to be bound thereby, (Stipulation of Fact 
No. 12, R. 78.) 
It is fundamental contract law that an agreement between 
two or more parties having capacity to contract, which is based 
on mutual assent and supported by legally sufficient considera-
tion, creates a binding obligation in the absence of any grounds 
for disaffirming the contract. 1 S. Williston, Contracts §1 
(3d ed. 1957). Furthermore, it makes no difference whether the 
terms of the contract are embodied in a formal pleading or in a 
separate instrument as long as the terms are clear and not altered 
by subsequent agreement of the parties. See Annot., 7 ALR2d 364, 
supra. In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that the basic 
elements of an enforceable contractual obligation have been 
stipulated to by the parties before the court. The State denies 
that it is bound by the agreement, however, on the grounds (inter 
alia) that its attorney lacked power to bind the Commission without 
its prior knowledge, approval and consent. (R. 107-08.) 
B. WHATEVER ACTS PUBLIC OFFICIALS MAY DO OR AUTHORIZE 
TO BE DONE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE MAY SUBSEQUENTLY 
BE ADOPTED AND RATIFIED BY THEM. 
According to the general rule set forth in the cases 
and supported by the decisions of this court, the contractual act 
-12-
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of a public officer which is beyond the scope of his authority 
is not binding on the state unless the following conditions are 
met: 
1. The particular state agency involved would have 
been authorized to perform the act or enter into the agreement 
in the first instance; and 
2. The state agency either held out the officer as 
having authority to perform the original act or subsequently 
ratified the act with full knowledge of the facts. Farelly Lake 
Levee District v. Hampton, 228 Ark. 242, 306 S.W.2d 699 (1957); 
Yaeger v. Giguerre, 222 Minn. 41, 23 N.W.2d 22 (1946). See 
also State Road Commission v. Bates, 20 Utah 2d 175, 435 P.2d 
417 (1967). 
In the context of the case at bar, the Yaeger case 
is particularly enlightening. In that case the plaintiffs, 
as members of the police department and taxpayers in the City 
of South St. Paul, brought suit against the city treasurer and 
others to enjoin the defendants from paying out any further 
public funds as compensation for the services of one Ed Giguerre 
who was allegedly employed as a police officer in violation of 
certain civil service statutes and local rules. The nub of the 
controversy was that defendant Giguerre obtained a leave of absence 
with the approval of the police chief, but without the final 
approval of the civil service commission as required under the 
rules. From a judgment denying injunctive relief, the plaintiffs 
appealed. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the lower 
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court on the grounds that the subsequent act of the commission 
in approving defendant's leave, constituted a valid ratification 
of the police chief's action: 
There can be no question that the commission 
had the authority in the first instance to 
approve the leave as granted by the chief of 
police. It is a general rule that whatever 
acts public officials may do or authorize to 
be done in the first instance may subsequently 
be adopted or ratified by them with the same 
effect as though properly done under previous 
authority. Applying this rule to the instant 
case, it is clear that the civil service com-
mission by its belated action ratified the 
granting of a leave of absence with the same 
effect as if originally authorized. 23 N.W. 
2d at 25 (citations omitted). 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
in Yaeger is consistent with this court's decision in the case 
of State Road Commission v. Bates, 20 Utah 2d 175, 435 P.2d 417 
(1967). In that case, the State Road Commission brought a 
condemnation action to obtain a narrow strip of land belonging 
to the defendants which adjoined a nonaccess freeway. No 
issue was raised as to the state's right to take the land or as 
to the value thereof. The landowners did claim severance damage 
to their remaining land, however, by reason of their loss of 
access to the canyon stream for stock watering purposes. This 
contention was based upon an alleged promise by the state's 
negotiator that if the landowners would sign the deed, the 
Commission would provide the water. 435 P.2d at 417. 
In affirming the lower court's decision, this court 
held that the evidence supported the findings that the landowners 
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had been previously paid for their loss of access to water and 
that the purported promise of the state's negotiator to get 
water up onto the defendant's land was not binding on the Com-
mission. 43 5 P.2d at 418. This holding, however, was based on 
a factual situation that is clearly distinguishable from the case 
at bar; namely, that the Commission in Bates denied that it 
ever made any promise to the landowners, and there was no evidence 
of any subsequent ratification. 435 P.2d at 417. 
In the instant case, the record abundantly demonstrates 
that the State Road Commission had the authority to enter into 
the original agreement with Gorgoza and that it subsequently 
adopted and ratified the agreement executed by its attorney 
with full knowledge of the facts. Since each condition is 
essential to create a contractual obligation which is binding 
on the State, each will be considered separately. 
1. THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION WAS AUTHORIZED TO 
ENTER INTO THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT WITH 
GORGOZA AT THE TIME IT WAS MADE. 
At the time the original agreement with Gorgoza was 
made, the State Road Commission enjoyed the following general 
powers and duties: 
The commission shall administer the state highways 
and exercise those powers and duties which relate 
to the determination and carrying out of the 
general policy of the state relating thereto. 
It shall exercise such control over the location, 
establishment, changing, construction and main-
tenance of highways as is provided by law. Utah 
Code Ann. §27-12-7 (Repl. vol. 1969). 
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In addition to the above general powers, the Commission was 
also vested with the following specific powers which are 
relevant here: 
(1) To formulate and adopt rules and regu-
lations and establish programs for the expenditure 
of public funds for the construction, improvement 
and maintenance of state highways, and other pur-
poses authorized by law, and for letting contracts 
for any work which the commission is authorized 
by law to do. 
(2) To determine what portion or portions of 
any state highway shall be improved at the expense 
of the state. 
(17) To expend sufficient of the funds 
allocated to the commission to accomplish the 
purposes of this act. Utah Code Ann. §27-12-8 
(Repl. vol. 1969). 
Pursuant to the foregoing powers, the Commission was 
authorized to enter into contracts and written agreements for 
the construction and maintenance of state highways, Utah Code 
Ann. §27-12-107 (Repl. vol. 1969), and could be sued on written 
contracts made by it or under its authority. Utah Code Ann. 
§27-12-9 (Repl. vol. 1969)(emphasis added). Finally, the 
State Road Commission was vested with powers of eminent domain 
for the purpose of condemning rights of way for state highway 
purposes. Utah Code Ann. §78-34-1 (1953); Barnes v. Wade, 
90 Utah 1, 58 P.2d 297 (1936). 
Pursuant to the lawful exercise of its eminent domain 
powers, the State Road Commission, by and through its attorney, 
entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs to provide reason-
able commercial access to Gorgoza's remaining land during the 
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construction period beginning in 1971. The state's purpose in 
negotiating the contract was to facilitate the entry of an order 
of immediate occupancy without expending the time and money 
required to serve nonresident defendants, wait for a hearing 
date, and prepare and present evidence of the value of the pre-
mises sought to be condemned together with the damages which 
would result, all in a contested matter. See Utah Code Ann. 
§78-34-9 (Supp. 1975). Since the agreement was directed solely 
at facilitating the lawful exercise of the Commission's eminent 
domain power so that the highway project could be advertised 
for bid without further delay, (R. 106), it clearly falls within 
the Commission's broad authority to enter into contracts for 
"any work which the Commission is authorized by law to do" as 
set forth above. 
2. THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION ADOPTED AND RATIFIED 
THE AGREEMENT WITH GORGOZA WITH THE SAME EFFECT 
AS THOUGH PROPERLY EXECUTED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. 
According to the principles of ratification set forth 
in Williston: 
Subsequent affirmance by a principal of a contract 
made on his behalf by one who had at the time 
neither actual nor apparent authority constitutes 
a ratification, and such ratification relates back 
and supplies original authority to execute the 
contract. 
Ratification need not be express. Any conduct which 
indicates assent or its equivalent by the purported 
principal to become a party to the transaction, 
or by reason of which he has precluded himself 
from repudiating the transaction done by the 
purported agent is sufficient. 2 S. Williston, 
Contracts §278 at 253, 256-58 (3d ed. 1959) 
(citations omitted). 
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In the case at bar, the record abundantly demonstrates 
that the State Road Commission acting through its Department of 
Highways not only knew of the agreement to provide commercial 
access to Gorgoza, but also took affirmative steps to begin to 
carry it out. The record also demonstrates that the Commission 
has never denied the agreement, but has expressly admitted its 
existence. The specific facts on which Gorgoza bases its 
allegation that the Commission ratified the agreement are as 
follows: 
a. Beginning in 1970, Gorgoza officials met with 
representatives of the State Department of Highways and 
supplied them with information detailing Gorgoza's need for 
adequate commercial access during periods of construction. 
(R. 33-35.) 
b. During the spring of 1971, Mr. James Conkling 
corresponded with the Director of the Department of Highways 
concerning the access problem. (R. 36-40.) This correspondence 
culminated on May 29, 1971, with Gorgozafs direct appeal for 
the State's assurance that adequate commercial access would be 
provided. (R. 40.) 
c. The agreement at issue was negotiated and entered 
into shortly thereafter. (R. 77.) 
d. Gorgoza officials met with the State Highway 
Engineer on September 28, 1971, at which time further oral 
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assurances regarding access to the resort were given. (R. 21.) 
e. On October 5, 1971, Mr. Conkling again contacted 
the State Highway Department about its decision to construct 
an access across Gorgozafs sloping middle entrance rather than 
across its larger western entrance as agreed. (R. 46, 48.) 
f. On or about October 15, 1971, the State Highway 
Engineer directed the general contracter, W. W. Clyde and Company, 
to construct an access road across Gorgoza's middle entrance and 
public funds were expended to accomplish this purpose according 
to the plans and specifications furnished by the project engineer. 
(R. 60.) 
g. Following Mr. Conklingfs notice to the State 
Highway Department of the unacceptable condition of the newly 
constructed access road, (R. 50), the State Highway Engineer 
sent a memorandum to the district engineer reiterating the 
State's commitment to the agreement as follows: 
MEMORANDUM 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS 
DATE: November 10, 1971 
TO : J. Q. Adair, P.E. 
District Engineer, District #2 
FROM : Blaine J. Kay, P.E. 
State Highway Engineer 
SUBJECT: Access and Signing for Gorgoza 
Officials of Gorgoza have rightly complained 
that problems in access have seriously hampered their 
business. They are very concerned about the present 
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condition of the recently constructed access road 
and the lack of advance information to the traveling 
public of this winter-oriented recreational area. I 
have assured Mr. Jim Conkling, owner, that the 
approach constructed late this fall will be main-
tained by the State through the limits of the newly 
placed gravel. I have also informed him that we will 
install temporary white on brown signing both east and 
west (approximately 1500 feet) which will indicate 
"Recreation Area 1500 Feet". A recent inspection 
indicates that the approach road is in need of repair; 
therefore, I would appreciate your early action in 
making the necessary corrections and provide for the 
installation of the mentioned signs. 
cc: Jim Conkling 
(R. 51.) 
h. The State Road Commission has never denied the 
existence of the agreement and has stated on the record that 
the resulting problems in its implementation were caused by the 
unreasonable conduct of its general contractor. This position 
is set forth in the Commission's answers to certain interroga-
tories propounded by W. W. Clyde and Company: 
5. Does the State Road Commission contend that 
W. W. Clyde and Company deviated in any manner from 
the plans and specifications, or special orders given 
to it on the job, for the construction of the approaches, 
access roads, or highway in the area of the Gorgoza 
resort? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
6. If the answer to the previous interrogatory 
is in the affirmative, state each and every deviation 
or variance from the plans and specifications or 
special orders and state the name, address, and 
position with the State Road Commission of any person 
having knowledge of any such deviations or variances. 
ANSWER: According to the project engineer's 
diary, the defendant, W. W. Clyde and Company, was 
directed on or about November 1, 1971, to construct 
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a temporary approach and to install a drainage culvert 
to provide safe and easy access to plaintiff's property. 
This approach was to be a paved surface. As late as 
November 12, 1971, the approach was not constructed 
as directed and said defendant's equipment had to be 
used to pull vehicles out of the approach because 
of wet conditions caused by inclement weather. The 
approach was paved on November 15, 1971, according to 
the project engineer's diary. This defendant considers 
the delay of the defendant, W. W. Clyde & Company, to 
be unreasonable. The person having knowledge of these 
facts is John F. Nye, Project Engineer, Utah State 
Department of Highways, 2410 West 2100 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. There are possibly other instances 
where the contractor may have been derelict, but this 
defendant cannot at this time state that that is the 
case until all records are reviewed and checked. 
(R. 72.) 
i. The existence of the agreement between Gorgoza and 
the State Road Commission was admitted by the Commission on April 
18, 1974, in its answer to plaintiffs' complaint. In Paragraph 
4 of the First Count of plaintiffs' complaint, the following 
allegation is made: 
4. On the 7th day of June, 1971, plaintiffs 
and defendant State of Utah, by and through 
its Road Commission, after negotiating the 
terms thereof, stipulated and agreed to the 
entry of an Order of Immediate Occupancy by 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Summit 
County, State of Utah, and on said date the 
Court entered an Order of Immediate Occupancy 
incorporating the said stipulation and agree-
ment of the parties. A copy of said Order of 
Immediate Occupancy is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part 
hereof. (R. 1-2.)(Emphasis added.) 
Defendant State Road Commission subsequently admitted 
plaintiffs' allegation in its entirety in Paragraph 3 of the 
Second Defense of its Answer on file herein: 
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3. This answering defendant admits the alle-
gations of paragraph 3 and 4 of the First 
Count of plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 11.) 
This binding admission together with the above facts 
on record herein, make it clear that the State Road Commission 
has recognized, adopted and taken specific steps to implement 
the contractual agreement executed by its attorney on June 7, 
1971. Indeed the Commission has never denied the existence or 
terms thereof. Gorgoza contends that such acts and conduct 
together with the clear evidence of the State's intent as expressed 
in the written memoranda, answers to interrogatories and admissions 
on file herein, clearly demonstrate the State Road Commission's 
adoption and ratification of the agreement of June 7, 1971. 
Under the authorities cited above, the State's ratification was 
effective as of the date of the original agreement. See 2 S. 
Williston, Contracts §278 (3d ed. 1959) The State Road 
Commission therefore incurred a binding contractual obligation 
to provide reasonable commercial access to Gorgoza's remaining 
land as of June 7, 1971. 
POINT II 
THE STATE'S AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE 
DISAFFIRMED ON GROUNDS OF GOVERN-
MENTAL IMMUNITY, SINCE THE LEGIS-
LATURE HAS EXPRESSLY WAIVED THE 
STATE'S IMMUNITY FROM SUIT BASED 
UPON THE ALLEGED BREACH OF A CON-
TRACTUAL OBLIGATION. 
The State argued below that plaintiffs' action was 
barred by governmental immunity. (R. 110-111.) Gorgoza 
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contends that the lower court erred in ruling on this question, 
specifically by entering its fourth conclusion of law to the effect 
that the negotiation and execution of the agreement by the State's 
attorney constituted a waiver of governmental immunity which was 
invalid. (R. 131.) 
The express provision of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act relied on by plaintiffs reads as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived as to any contractual obligation. Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-5 (Repl. vol. 1968). 
In the case at bar, the State Road Commission has ad-
mitted that it entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs, the 
terms of which were incorporated in the order of immediate occu-
pancy entered June 7, 1971. (R. 1-2; 11.) Furthermore, even if 
the Commission's attorney were not authorized to enter into this 
agreement in the first place, the Commission later ratified 
the agreement by its subsequent acts and admissions which 
ratification related back to and supplied the original authority 
to contract. 2 S. Williston, Contracts §278 (3d ed. 1959). 
Defendant State Road Commission thereby incurred an express 
contractual obligation to the plaintiffs as of June 7, 1971, 
which is enforceable in an action for damages under the 
express provisions of the Act itself. 
^The statutory provision cited above was in effect during the 
period of time in which the factual events pertaining to this 
case took place. The section has since been amended. See 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-5 (Supp. 1975). 
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In three recent cases, this court has considered the 
question of impairment of access to property in view of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. In Boyce v. State Road Commission, 
26 Utah 2d 138, 486 P.2d 387 (1971), the plaintiff brought an 
action for damages to property, the access to which had been 
allegedly destroyed by a state road construction project. 
486 P.2d at 388. The basis of plaintiff's claim was that 
certain agents of the State misrepresented to him that the 
construction project would not injure or impede access to 
his property. Id. This court upheld the State's claim of 
immunity on the grounds that plaintiff's suit was barred by the 
express provisions of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(6) (Repl. vol. 
196 8) which prohibits suits against the State arising "out of 
a misrepresentation" made by a state employee. Id. 
The Boyce case is clearly distinguishable from the 
facts at issue here. While in Boyce, the case turned upon an 
alleged misrepresentation made by agents of the State, such was 
never the case in Gorgoza. On the contrary, Gorgoza's claim is 
that an express contractual agreement, adopted and acted upon 
by the State, was breached in that reasonable commercial 
access was not provided as agreed. The State in Gorgoza 
has not even alleged that any misrepresentations were involved. 
Thus the statutory provision under which plaintiffs' claim 
was barred in Boyce is irrelevant to the consideration of the 
plaintiffs' claim in Gorgoza. 
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In another case brought to recover damages caused by 
reason of the construction of a highway which impaired access 
to property, the plaintiffs did not contest the validity of those 
cases holding that in the absence of a taking of property there 
can be no recovery against the State for damages due to the 
impairment of access to property, but contended that the pro-
visions of the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-6 
(Repl. vol. 196 8) should be construed as affirmatively permitting 
the maintenance of such action. Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 
30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286, 1287 (1973). 
The statutory provision in question reads as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for the recovery of any 
property real or personal or for the posses-
sion thereof or to quiet title thereto, or 
to foreclose mortgages or other liens thereon 
or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or 
secure any adjudication touching any mortgage 
or other lien said entity may have or claim 
on the property involved. 
In construing this section in light of plaintiffs1 
claims, the court strictly applied the Act and held that the 
above section was not to be construed so as to include damage 
actions of this character. It should be clearly noted, how-
ever, that no allegation of any contractual obligation on the 
part of the State was considered by the court in this case. 
The third opinion was handed down by this court in 
the case of Bailey Service & Supply Corp. v. State Road Com-
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mission, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975). In that case, the State 
appealed from a judgment awarding damages to the plaintiff 
arising out of the erection of a viaduct on Fourth South 
Street in Salt Lake City. 533 P.2d at 883. Part of the 
court's opinion in that case in instructive here: 
Early in the proceedings the State Road Commission 
entered into a stipulation with the plaintiff which 
purported to waive governmental immunity. The stipu-
lation was disavowed, and the State defended on the 
ground that the State was immune from suit. Only 
the legislature can waive sovereign immunity and the 
Road Commission's attempt to do so was without legal 
effect. The trial court did not base is (sic) decision 
upon the ground that governmental immunity had been 
waived but rather upon the court's determination 
that there was a "taking" by reason of the interference 
with the right of access. 
The Bailey case is distinguishable from the case at 
bar at several critical points: 
1. The stipulation itself purported to waive 
governmental immunity in contravention of the express terms 
of the Act; 
2. The stipulation was disavowed by the State. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that the State 
of Utah adopted and ratified and thereby rendered binding the 
contractual agreement with plaintiffs the terms of which were 
incorporated into the order of immediate occupancy entered on 
June 7, 1971. Thus the agreement in this case does not involve 
any "purported waiver" of immunity as was referred to in Bailey, 
but a transaction which falls squarely within the express waiver 
provisions of the Act itself. Furthermore, the state has not 
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disaffirmed the agreement, but has admitted its existence, acted 
pursuant to its terms, and affirmed its intention to be bound 
thereby. The State has incurred a binding contractual obligation 
and should not be allowed to disaffirm it on the basis of authori-
ties which are silent regarding the specific issue at bar. 
POINT III 
THE STATE'S AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE 
DISAFFIRMED ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
TEMPORARY OBSTRUCTION OF COMMER-
CIAL ACCESS IS NONCOMPENSABLE, 
SINCE THE BASIS OF THE PLAINTIFFS' ...., 
CLAIM IS THAT THE STATE ACTED UN-
REASONABLY IN BREACHING ITS CON-
TRACT WITH GORGOZA. 
The State argued below that accepted principles of 
eminent domain deny recovery for damages sustained for temporary 
or permanent impairment of access. (R. 108.) Gorgoza's 
position is that this general statement of eminent domain law 
is subject to clear exception in the case of unreasonable 
acts by the condemnor, which exception is fully applicable here. 
Gorgoza therefore submits that the lower court erred in entering 
its fifth conclusion of law which sets forth the general rule, 
but fails to apply the relevant exceptions. (R. 131.) 
According to the general rule set forth in 2A Nichols, 
Eminent Domain §6.4442[2] (rev. 3d ed. 1975), 
When a street is so obstructed during the 
construction of a public work that access to 
abutting property is wholly cut off, the fact 
that the injury is only temporary is generally 
held to be no reason for denying the owner com-
pensation. However, when access, though ren-
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dered difficult and inconvenient, is not wholly 
cut off, the owner is denied compensation. This 
is so even if there is such an injury to the use 
of the property for business purposes during the 
construction of the work as to materially affect 
the value of the leasehold interests, and this 
injury is due to the presence of structures in 
the street that would undoubtedly constitute a 
ground for compensation if they were maintained 
there permanently. 
This general rule is subject to clear exception, 
however, in cases of negligence, unreasonable, unnecessary, 
arbitrary or capricious acts by the condemnor. Id.., citing 
Hadfield v. State, 86 Idaho 561, 388 P.2d 1018 (1964); 
Department of Public Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal.2d 217, 352 
P.2d 519 (1960). 
The "unreasonable interference" exception cited 
above has been recognized in the decisions of this court. In 
the case of Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 
349 P.2d 157 (1960), plaintiff brought a mandamus action to 
compel members of the State Road Commission to initiate eminent 
domain proceedings to assess damages allegedly caused by 
impairment of ingress to and egress from the plaintiff's 
property. 349 P.2d at 157-58. In discussing the question 
whether plaintiff's damages were compensable, the court made 
the following statement: 
In this area of the freeway, citizens must yield 
to the common weal, albeit injury to their property 
may result. We espouse the notion that if the 
sovereign exercises its police power reasonably 
and for the good of all the people, when construct-
ing highways, consequential damages such as those 
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alleged here, are not compensable. On the other 
hand, if public officials act arbitrarily and 
unreasonably, causing, for example, total destruc-
tion of the means to get in and out of one's 
property, without any reasonable justification 
for doing so in the public interest, in a manner 
that imposes a special burden on one not shared by 
the public generally, principles of equity no 
doubt could be invoked to prevent threatened 
action of such character or to remove any instru-
mentality born of such conduct. Plaintiff did 
not allege or assert anything akin thereto. 
349 P.2d at 158-59. (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that defendant 
State Road Commission violated its contractual obligation to 
provide plaintiffs and the general public with reasonable 
access to Gorgoza's remaining property. (R. 2.) The state 
subsequently took the position that its general contractor 
acted unreasonably in delaying proper construction of the 
access road until on or about November 15, 1971, (R. 72), after 
Gorgoza had been forced to abandon its operations. (R. 52.) 
Thus the interference involved here was of such a nature that 
it would fall into the "unreasonable interference" category 
which clearly supports a claim for damages under accepted 
principles of eminent domain law as recognized by this court. 
Under the authorities cited above, even in the absence 
of contract, a landowner may recover damages for temporary 
obstruction of commercial access if the obstruction is of an 
unreasonable, unnecessary, arbitrary or capricious nature. 
Plaintiffs contend that rather than affording defendant State 
Road Commission grounds for disaffirming its contract, the 
above line of authority supports plaintiffs' claim for damages 
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based on unreasonable and unnecessary conduct i.e., a material 
breach of a binding contractual obligation in the absence of 
legal excuse for nonperformance. 
POINT IV 
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE STATE'S 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION MAY BE DISAFFIRMED, 
THE LOWER COURT NEVERTHELESS ERRED IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS1 COMPLAINT IN ITS 
ENTIRETY, SINCE CONTROVERTED ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT STILL EXIST BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES 
In the second count of their complaint, plaintiffs1 
alleged that defendant State Road Commission acting through its 
duly authorized agents and employees negligently created a 
"defective, unsafe and dangerous condition of a highway, structures 
and other public improvements of the State of Utah," all to the 
plaintiffs1 damage. (R. 3.) These allegations were subsequently 
denied by the State. (R. 12.) Although both Gorgoza and 
the State Road Commission only moved the court for summary 
judgment on the sole issue whether the State had incurred a 
binding contractual obligation as alleged in the first count of 
plaintiffs1 complaint, (R. 119-20; 128-29), the lower court 
nevertheless dismissed both counts of plaintiffs' complaint 
as follows: ,....
 t i 
That plaintiffs1 Complaint be dismissed with 
prejudice on the grounds and for the reason 
that defendant, State Road Commission, is 
entitled to summary judgment in that there 
is no binding agreement or enforceable con-
tract existing between the parties as alleged 
by plaintiff and the State has not, therefore, 
waived its immunity from suit in an action of 
this kind. (R. 133.) 
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Plaintiffs contend that the lower court erred in entering the 
above judgment of dismissal together with its eighth conclusion 
of law on which such judgment of dismissal was based. (R. 131.) 
In rendering summary judgment for defendant State Road 
Commission, the lower court adopted and incorporated the stipula-
ton of the parties concerning facts as its findings of fact and 
made and entered its conclusions of law based thereon. (R. 130.) 
No additional evidence was presented by affidavit or otherwise, 
and no other findings of fact whatsoever were made. Since the 
stipulation of facts submitted by the parties was limited solely 
to those facts relevant to the contract issue before the court, 
it included no facts directly bearing on the negligence issue 
raised in the second count of plaintiffs1 complaint. As a 
result, the court did not make and enter a single conclusion of 
law bearing on plaintiffs' second count except conclusion of law 
number 8 which held that defendant was entitled to a judgment of 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R. 131.) 
This court has held on numerous occasions that summary 
judgment is properly granted only in cases in which there is no 
dispute as to any issue which is material to the settlement of 
the controversy. Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1975); Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974). If there 
are controverted facts at issue, there is an issue that is genuine, 
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and a motion for summary judgment should not be granted. Trone v. 
Pacific Wholesale Supply Co., 534 P.2d 895 (Utah 1975). The 
court may, however, render summary judgment on part of the case 
where appropriate. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(d). 
In the case at bar, the court was requested by all 
parties to render summary judgment solely on the contract issue 
raised in the first count of plaintiffs' complaint. Neither side 
submitted affidavits or any other evidence bearing on the 
negligence count for the court's consideration. Since plaintiffs' 
allegations regarding defendant State Road Commission's negligence 
in creating a defective and unsafe condition on the access road 
were denied in defendant's answer (R. 12), controverted facts 
remain at issue between the parties. The lower court therefore 
erred in rendering judgment on the whole case and should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
According to Utah Code Ann. §27-12-9 (Repl. vol. 
1969) , the State Road Commission may be sued on written contracts 
made by it or under its authority. Furthermore, the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act expressly waives immunity from suit 
based on the alleged breach of a contractual obligation. Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-5 (Repl. vol. 1968). Plaintiffs contend that 
the stipulation of facts, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file herein make it clear that the State Road 
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Commission incurred such a contractual obligation when it rati-
fied the agreement of its attorney, and that no valid grounds 
for disaffirming the contract exist. Furthermore, even if such 
grounds did exist, the lower court nevertheless erred in dis-
missing the whole case when controverted issues of material 
fact still exist between the parties. The judgment of the lower 
court should therefore be reversed and the case remanded for 
trial on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Robert F. Orton 
G. Richard Hill 
HANSEN & ORTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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